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Commentary in David Hitchcock’s, “Deep disagreement as intellectual colonialism” 
 
Matt McKeon 
Michigan State University  
 
  
I.  Introduction 
 
At the start here, I make three preliminary remarks. First, I am sympathetic with David 
Hitchcock’s case in support of his thesis that, “there is always a basis for a rational discussion 
between people who disagree” (Hitchcock, OSSA-12 paper, abstract). Second, my commentary 
turns almost exclusively on Hitchcock’s paper and Fogelin’s 2005 paper, which is a slightly 
updated version of his 1985 paper that Hitchcock works from.  My commentary does not dig into 
the literature on deep disagreement, which I am not familiar with. Third, I don’t see that Fogelin 
2005’s paper provides a plausible case against Hitchcock’s thesis. 
 
In what follows, I begin by trying to clarify some of the conceptual terrain working from the 
papers by Hitchcock and Fogelin.  Next, I take a stab at articulating Fogelin’s position on the 
connection between the possibility of argument and deep disagreement. I then explain why I find 
Fogelin’s position lacking in a way that I think is in sync with the case Hitchcock makes in 
support of his paper’s thesis. Finally, I conclude.    
 
II.  Clarifying the conceptual terrain   
 
Hitchcock tells us that his paper is devoted to addressing the following question. 
 
Under what circumstances if any is it reasonable for someone engaged in an 
argumentative exchange with someone else over an issue on which they disagree to 
decide that the two of them have a deep disagreement in Fogelin’s sense, to abandon the 
use of argument, and to resort to non-argumentative means of persuasion—means that 
do not involve an appeal to reasons—in an effort to get the other person to adopt their 
position on the issue? (section 2, p. 3) 
 
I take the question to presuppose, for the sake of argument, that there is such a thing as deep 
disagreement in Fogelin’s sense. Two different questions can be drawn out of the one explicitly 
posed. 
 
(1) When, if at all, is it reasonable for someone engaged in an argumentative exchange with 
someone else over an issue on which they disagree to decide that the two of them have a deep 
disagreement in Fogelin’s sense?  
 
Presumably, they must know (or, strongly suspect?) that they are involved in a deep 
disagreement. This raises question (1a):  How does one know that one is involved in a deep 
disagreement? That is, what, exactly, must be ascertained with a high degree of confidence? 
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(2) When, if at all, is it reasonable for two people in an argumentative exchange who have 
decided that they have a deep disagreement in Fogelin’s sense to resort to non-argumentative 
means of persuasion in an effort to get the other person to adopt their position on the issue? 
 
I suppose that plausible answers to (2) call upon relevant argumentation norms that are sensitive 
to the importance of what is at issue, as well as to other contextual matters.  This raises the 
question (2a): When, if at all, is it reasonable for someone engaged in an argumentative 
exchange with someone else over an issue on which they disagree to resort to non-argumentative 
means of persuasion in an effort to get the other person to adopt their position on the issue? 
Quoting Wittgenstein is nice, but, as Hitchcock suggests, it is hard to see how what Fogelin cites 
motivates an answer to (2a) and, therefore, to (2). “Intellectual colonialism” is certainly lurking 
here.       
 
I take answers to (1) and (2) to be independent. Answering epistemic question (1) doesn’t seem 
to deliver an answer to the normatively loaded question (2).  Conversely, it is unclear to me how 
an answer to (2) serves as a plausible guide to (1).  
 
Clarifying questions (1) and (2) requires getting at the gist of Fogelin’s characterization of a deep 
disagreement and honing in on its significance to the activity of arguing.  Drawing from Fogelin, 
Hitchcock takes a deep disagreement to be a “disagreement in which the parties who disagree 
lack shared beliefs and preferences from which, using shared procedures for resolving 
disagreements, they can reason to a shared position on the issue” (p. 4).  According to Fogelin, 
an outcome of such a disagreement is that the argumentative context is not normal or nearly 
normal (2005, p.7).  The significance of this for Fogelin is that “to the extent that the 
argumentative context becomes less normal, argument to that extent becomes impossible” (p.7), 
i.e., “the conditions for argument do not exist” (p.7).  This raises the question: what are the 
conditions essential to arguing that are allegedly nullified by a deep disagreement?     
 
III. Fogelin’s position on the connection between deep disagreement and the conditions for 
argument  
 
Fogelin remarks that a deep disagreement arises from a clash of underlying principles (2005, p. 
8). What are the relevant underlying principles? Fogelin says that they are “framework 
propositions” in Putnam’s sense or “rules” in Wittgenstein’s sense. We get a deep disagreement 
when the argument is generated by a clash of (i.e., a conflict between) framework propositions 
(2005, p. 8).  
 
The following argument captures my initial understanding of Fogelin’s connection between deep 




(1) A clash of framework propositions undercuts an essential condition for arguing. 
(2) Deep disagreements arise from a clash of framework propositions  
 Deep disagreements cannot be resolved through arguing.  
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I take “arguing” here to be the use of argument—in its reason-giving sense—to persuade another 
of the conclusion. Fogelin’s argument is silent on question (2). However, it partially addresses 
question (1) by suggesting an answer to question (1a). One knows that one is in a deep 
disagreement when one knows that there is a clash of framework propositions relative to the 
argumentative exchange at hand. If I follow Fogelin, symptoms of a clash of framework 
propositions implicit in a deep disagreement include the disagreement persisting even when 
normal criticisms have been answered, and that the disagreement is immune to appeals to facts 
(2005, p. 9).     
 
It is hard to judge the plausibility of premise (1) and hard to understand premise (2) unless the 
technical notion of a framework proposition is clear.  Clearly, “framework proposition” is 
theory-laden.  I confess that I am unfamiliar with the literature on Putnam’s notion of a 
framework proposition and I have forgotten Wittgenstein’s notion of a rule. Fogelin doesn’t 
provide an account of framework propositions to help me out.   
 
IV. Fogelin’s position is not persuasive 
 
Since I am not equipped to bring theoretical considerations regarding framework propositions to 
bear on Hitchcock’s plausible case against Fogelin’s argument, I rely on Fogelin’s quick 
examples to get at what a clash of framework propositions is supposed to look like.  I take 
Fogelin to be using these examples to illustrate premise (1).  However, it is not clear to me that 
the examples do illustrate premise (1). I now elaborate.    
 
Fogelin considers an argumentative exchange about whether race-based quotas are ethical (2005, 
p.10). Pro advances a position that commits Pro to the framework proposition A= social groups 
can have moral claims against other social groups. Con’s position is associated with the 
framework proposition A*= only individuals can have moral claims.  The incompatibility (the 
“clash”) between A and A* turns on the claim that social groups do not count as individuals. Is it 
true that argument is impossible regarding what counts as an individual? After all, there is a 
healthy legal debate on whether corporations are individuals with rights.  I am unfamiliar with 
the literature on the metaphysics of individuals, but it is far from obvious to me that arguing is 
impossible here.       
 
Fogelin uses the abortion debate to illustrate a “clash of framework propositions necessary for 
deep disagreements. Is abortion in all cases the killing of a person? Pro believes P=that life 
begins shortly after conception. Con rejects P.  Pro’s reason for her P-belief is that Pro accepts 
framework proposition F= shortly after conception God implants an immortal soul into the 
fertilized egg thereby bringing a person into existence. Pro’s acceptance of F derives—in some 
way—from Pro’s commitment to a way of life as, say, a Catholic. Con does not accept F and 
does not share Pro’s commitment to a Catholic way of life.    
 
Here I take the example to illustrate that the clash over F generates a deep disagreement in Pro’s 
and Con’s argumentative exchange about whether abortion in all cases is the killing of a person.  
Are the conditions for further argument thereby nullified? It seems to me that Fogelin himself 
leaves open some wiggle-room for a negative response.        
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“[Deep Disagreements] remain recalcitrant to adjudication because the sources of the 
disagreement—the framework propositions—are allowed to lie in the background, working at a 
distance.  The way to put the debate on a rational basis is [to] surface these background 
propositions and then discuss them directly.” (2005, p. 8) 
 
Why is it necessary that rational discussion in the context of deep disagreement about conflicting 
framework propositions precludes the possibility of the use of argument in its reason-giving 
sense?  If Pro aims to persuade Con to accept P on the basis of Pro’s reasons, then Pro would 
have to convert Con to the Catholic way of life.  Perhaps not a promising dialectical strategy.  
Nevertheless, with all due respect to Wittgenstein, it is not obvious to me that the use of 
argument is impossible in the attempt to rationally persuade an individual to adopt the Catholic 
way of life. Such an attempt doesn’t seem immune to facts and isn’t obviously invulnerable to 
“normal” criticisms.  The devil is in the details.      
 
In short, I don’t see offhand that Fogelin’s quick examples of deep disagreement—in his sense—
illustrate that deep disagreement necessarily rules out the possibility of arguing.  What does seem 
to be the case in both examples is that in order for participants in the sample argumentative 
exchanges to directly engage a deep disagreement through rational discussion there is a change 
of topic. There is a move from the ethicality of race-based quotas to the metaphysics of 
individuals, and a move from the topic of whether abortion kills an individual to reasons for 




To conclude, I see Hitchcock’s case against Fogelin turning on the plausibility of rejecting that a 
clash of framework propositions undercuts an essential condition for arguing, i.e., turns on 
rejecting premise 1 of what I am calling Fogelin’s argument.  I think that Hitchcock advances a 
plausible case against premise 1, but, again, I don’t really know what a framework proposition is 
supposed to be. If there are no such propositions associated with an argumentative stance, then I 
don’t understand the disagreement about deep disagreements—in Fogelin’s sense.  
 
Of course, even if Fogelin’s examples are bad or easily become caricatures of argumentative 
exchanges when filled out, that doesn’t show that there are no framework propositions or that 
premise 1 is false. I am reminded of David Lewis’ letter to the editors of a collection of papers 
on the law of non-contradiction (Letter 1, 2004), explaining why he declined their offer to submit 
a paper in support of his position that the law of non-contradiction is correct. The editors 
received permission to publish the letter.  In it, Lewis writes that he’s incapable of writing the 
requested paper in part because every argument in defense of the law of non-contradiction that 
he is aware of that has a chance to be plausible either appeals to principles in dispute and thus 
begs the question, or appeals to principles so much less certain than non-contradiction. 
 
Perhaps, we can say that P is a framework proposition relative to an arguer’s argumentative 
stance when the arguer is unable to produce an argument in defense of P that grounds her 
certainty of P and that is neither circular nor question-begging against the relevant contrary 
stance(s).  This makes it a little easier for me to see how a “clash” of framework propositions can 
stalemate an argumentative exchange in a way that motivates eschewing arguments without 
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necessarily dismissing the legitimacy of contrary points of view.  However, subsequent rational 
discussion can meaningfully deepen participants’ understanding of the involved points of view, 
which can give rise to new arguments that modify their point of view or extinguish the stalemate.   
For me, this is a takeaway from David Hitchcock’s paper that is valuable because it motivates 
further thinking about the significance of a diagnosis of deep disagreement—in Fogelin’s sense 
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